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Résumé: Nous examinons l'impact de la structure horizontale et verticale d'un marché sur les 
incitations à l'innovation et sur la variété des produits. Nous considérons le marché 
d'un bien homogène où un producteur peut innover pour étendre sa gamme de 
produits en créant un nouveau produit substitut. Le coût de lancement du nouveau 
produit est fixe, et réparti entre les activités de production et de distribution. Nous 
montrons qu'une chaîne intégrée verticalement offre une plus grande variété de 
produits qu'une chaîne de monopoles. Si le coût de lancement du nouveau produit est 
réparti équitablement entre les deux secteurs, ou supporté essentiellement par 
l'amont, une concurrence imparfaite dans le secteur aval ne restaure que 
partiellement les incitations à innover de la structure verticale. En revanche, si ce 
coût est supporté principalement par le secteur aval, la concurrence en aval peut 
amener plus d'innovation que dans une structure verticalement intégrée.  
 
Abstract: We examine the impact of horizontal and vertical market structure on innovation and 
product variety. We consider a market for a homogeneous good where it is possible to 
innovate to launch a new substitute product. The cost of launching the new product is 
fixed and spread between the manufacturing and the retail industries. We show that 
a vertically intergrated firm offers a wider variety of products than a chain of 
monopolies. If the cost of launching a new product is equally shared among the 
vertical structure or mostly supported by upstream firms, retail competition partially 
restores the incentives to innovate of the vertical structure. Yet when the cost of 
launching a new product is mostly supported by the retail sector, downstream 
competition even leads to more innovation than vertical integration. 
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Retail structure and product variety
Marie-Laure Allain∗and Patrick Waelbroeck†
Abstract
In this paper, we examine the impact of horizontal and vertical market
structure on innovation and product variety. We consider a market for a ho-
mogeneous good where it is possible to innovate to launch a new substitute
product. The cost of launching the new product is fixed and spread between
the manufacturing and the retail industries. We show that a vertically inter-
grated firm oﬀers a wider variety of products than a chain of monopolies. If the
cost of launching a new product is equally shared among the vertical structure
or mostly supported by upstream firms, retail competition partially restores the
incentives to innovate of the vertical structure. Yet when the cost of launching a
new product is mostly supported by the retail sector, downstream competition
even leads to more innovation than vertical integration.
1 Introduction
The market structure of the retail sector is an important policy issue in most de-
veloped countries. Since the seventies, the emergence of new store formats and the
development of large and increasingly international retail chains, through diversifi-
cation and external growth, have considerably modified the retail landscape. The
increasing concentration of the retail industry has resulted in an oligopolistic struc-
ture in most European countries: the 5 main retail chains control about 65% of the
food sales in the UK, 80% in France, 65% in Germany, 56% in Spain and up to 98.5%
in Norway. Large mergers among retail groups have occurred in the nineties. The
2000 merger between Carrefour and Promodès has given birth to the second largest
∗CNRS, Laboratoire d’Econométrie de l’Ecole Polytechnique (1 rue Descartes 75 005 Paris,
France, E-Mail : marie-laure.allain@polytechnique.fr) and London Business School.
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worldwide retail group with sales above 70 billions euro. In 1999, the American giant
Wal Mart acquired the British supermarket chain ASDA, but the same year, the Eu-
ropean Commission set restrictive conditions to the merger of the German retailers
REWE and Meinl. The Commission even prohibited merger of the Finnish groups
Kesko and Tuko in 1996. This trend towards increasing retail concentration leads to
increased buying power from the retailers, and thus induces a shift in the balance of
power between retailers and their suppliers, which has generated many conflicts. The
retail industry may be compared to the bottleneck of an hourglass, controlling the
links between numerous manufacturers of consumer goods and their consumers.
Public authorities have debated over the last years issues related to the bargaining
power between producers and retailers in order to assess the economic consequences of
increasing retail concentration (see, for instance, the green book on vertical restraints
published by the European commission in 1997 or the oﬃcial report by the British
Oﬃce of Fair Trading of 1999). Broadly speaking, arguments against large retailers
relate to the fact that a marked disequilibrium in the bargaining power between
suppliers and retailers can be detrimental to the survival of small producers and
especially to the variety of products available to the consumers.
Both retailers and suppliers consider the breadth of the product line as a crucial
point in the bargaining process. On the one hand, producers implement innovation
strategies that segment the market in order to discriminate between diﬀerent types of
consumers. They thus tend to extend their product lines. On the other hand, retailers
fear brand proliferation as it increases costs associated with inventory control and in-
volves increasing marketing and promotion expenses. As a consequence, retailers often
impose contracts that limit the number of products available on the shelves. Hence
the economic incentives to produce and distribute a new variety diﬀer according to the
side of the vertical relation. While producers expect their new products to increase
demand by building new niches, retailers fear market segmentation that increases dis-
tribution costs (Marvel and Peck, 2000). Upstream and downstream firms’ goals can
thus diverge and harsh commercial bargaining talks reflect these divergences.
In order to understand the economic forces behind the conflict, we analyze the
incentives to supply variety in a vertically related industry between innovating pro-
ducers, retailers and consumers. We determine the eﬀect of the vertical relation on
social welfare by studying the incentives to increase product variety according to the
competitiveness of the downstream sector. We focus on two main points: the size of
the innovation, i.e. its novelty, and the fixed costs of launching the new product, split
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up into production and retail costs related to inventory control and promotion. We
study a vertical relation between a monopolist producer and a retail sector, which
is successively monopolistic and oligopolistic. The producers develop a new product
(that we will also refer to as "innovation") that is costly to develop and that gener-
ates distribution costs. We analyze how the way these fixed costs are shared between
producers and retailers influence the incentives to oﬀer a new variety.
It is diﬃcult to assess the costs associated with the launching of a new product.
Deloitte and Touche (1990) estimate that this cost is on average $222 per item and per
store for a producer. The cost can be broken down as follows: 18% comes from research
and development, 66% from marketing expenses, and 16% in slotting allowances that
can reach $36.4 per item and per store. For a retailer, costs related to assessing
the market potential of a product, changing the information processing system and
inventory control are smaller (about $13.5 per item and per store). However, these
costs do not include the opportunity cost related to shelf space occupied by the product
line that could have been granted to another product, nor the marketing eﬀorts that
are required to sell the new product, nor the cost of deleting another item from the
catalogue that can reach, according to the same study, $11 per item per store. Of
course, these estimates must be taken with caution since these costs greatly vary
according to the nature of the new product.
From an empirical perspective, the diﬃculty to correctly measure these costs and
the strategic dimension of the issue certainly explain why there are few studies on
this topic. A recent survey of German food producers (Weiss and Wittkopp, 2005)
highlights a negative relationship between the bargaining power of large retailers and
the introduction of new products. However, this eﬀect is reduced by the market power
of producers. While there is a huge literature on the economic analysis of vertical
relationships on the one hand, and on innovation and incentives to innovate on the
other hand, there has been little work on the incentives to innovate in a vertically
separated industry. Yet most of the consumers’ goods are sold through a vertical
channel, and the producers have to deal with retailers to sell their products. Lariviere
and Padmanabhan (1997) analyze slotting allowances paid by producers to distribute
their products through retail channels. In a chain of monopolies, they show that a
producer who is better informed on demand conditions than the retailer can set high
wholesale prices in order to signal a high expected demand. The producer thus pays
a slotting allowance that increases with the fixed distribution cost supported by the
retailer. However, their analysis takes the innovation decision as given and does not
3
take competition between retailers into account.
Brocas (2002) is closer to our analysis, but she deals with a process innovation
and not a product innovation on the one hand, and on the other hand, the vertical
structure that links the research unit to the producers does not include a retailer. Her
article analyses the eﬀect of competition and vertical integration between producers
and the research units on the incentives to innovate. Research units license their
process innovation that can be more or less substitutable. The eﬃciency of a vertical
integration between research units and producers depends on the substitutability and
the size of the innovation. We assume on the contrary that R&D activities are carried
out in-house.
Product variety in a competitive and vertically structured setting also involves
bargaining issues. Inderst and Shaﬀer (2003) analyze the eﬀect of a horizontal merger
between non-competing retailers (assuming for instance that they are operating on two
distinct geographical areas) on the variety oﬀered to consumers. They show that after
the merger and in order to improve their bargaining power with the producers, retailers
might have to remove some products from the shelves: making their product lines more
uniform would enable them to get better bargaining terms with their suppliers. In
this case, an increase in the bargaining of the retailers leads to a decrease in product
variety. However, rather than looking at product line simplification, we address the
question of launching new products when it incurs specific costs.
Our article contributes to the literature on three points. First, we show that a ver-
tically integrated structure better internalizes the fixed costs of R&D and marketing
than a chain of separated monopolies and oﬀer a larger variety of products. This first
result rests on a classical reduction of the ineﬃciency related to the double margin
that limits product innovation. Next, we show that a situation in which retailers are
competing gives more incentives to improve the product line than a chain of monop-
olies, mainly by reducing vertical ineﬃciencies. Finally, we show that competition
between retailers can surprisingly lead to more product innovation than a vertically
integrated structure when the cost of launching the new product is mainly borne by
the upstream firm. This result stems from the fact that the producer might strate-
gically reduce competition between retailers by charging them retail prices that force
them to specialize. In this case, one of the retailers specializes in the new product,
while the other only sell the old product. By reducing competition in such way, this
situation allows the producer to reduce the costs associated with the new product,
where a vertically integrated structure would not have innovated. In addition, we
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show that this increase in product variety is welfare-enhancing.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. First, we study the decision of
a producer who sells his products through a vertically separated chain of monopolies
in Section 2. Next, we analyze in section 3 a situation where the same producer faces
two retailers who compete for his products. The last section concludes the article.
2 The model
We consider a vertical relation between a producer P and her retailer D. We assume
that the producer is unable to set up shop and sell independently. She initially
produces a good A at a constant marginal cost cA that we normalise to zero without
loss of generality. The producer can invest a fixed costΩ to innovate and then produces
also a substitute good B with a constant marginal cost cB = cA = 0. Products A and
B are horizontally diﬀerentiated: we consider here product innovation as a mean to
improve product variety, not product quality. Inverse demand is linear and translates
consumers’ taste for variety, with PI the unit price of good I, and qI the quantity of
good I on the market ({I, J} = {A,B}):
PI(qI , qJ) = 1− qI − cqJ
Parameter c, that we assume to be in [0,1[, measures the substitution between
the two goods. The retailer distributes the product A without cost. However if he
decides to introduce the new product on the final market, he has to incur a fixed
cost of marketing and inventory control, noted F . The retailer also faces a constant
marginal cost of distribution independent of the type of product that is distributed,
which we normalise to zero. The exogenous parameters of the models are: c, Ω, F.
We compare the producer’s incentives to invest the fixed cost of innovation Ω in
two diﬀerent cases: when the producer and the retailer are vertically integrated and
when they are separated.
2.1 The benchmark case: vertically integrated monopoly
We first consider as a benchmark a situation in which the producer and the distributor
are vertically integrated. The integrated unit only innovates and sells both products
if it is profitable to do so. If the vertically integrated structure does not innovate,
it sells only A in quantity qA = 12 , and with profit ΠV IA =
1
4
. As introducing the
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new product involves a fixed cost, the structure that innovates has to choose whether
to continue selling product A in addition to product B or not (selling only B is a
dominated strategy, as it would lead to a maximum profit of ΠV IB = ΠV IA −Ω−F ). If
on the contrary the vertically integrated structure chooses to distribute both products,
the profit-maximizing quantities are then qA = qB = 12(1+c) , and the profit ΠIVA+B =
1
2(1+c) − F − Ω.
The vertically integrated monopoly thus innovates and sells both products if and
only if it leads to higher profits than without innovation, which is equivalent to the
following condition:
F + Ω ≤ 1− c
4(1 + c)
Thus the new product is profitable to market as long as the total fixed cost of
producing and retailing the new good are not above a threshold level that decreases
with the substituability between products: as c tends to 1 and products become more
substitutable, the firm is less likely to introduce the new product as its profits become
smaller. In a vertically integrated structure, this classical cannibalisation eﬀect is
driving innovation decisions.
2.2 Product variety in a vertically separated chain
We now study how the innovation decisions of a vertically separated industry depend
on how the total fixed cost is shared between the producer and the retailer. When
the producer and the retailer are vertically separated, the innovation decisions are
taken sequentially. Formally, the producer and the retailers play the following game:
in the first stage, the producer decides whether to increase her product line and
accordingly spends the fixed cost Ω. Then she sets the two wholesale prices wA and
wB , each in1 [0, 1]. In the second stage, the retailer decides which goods to sell to the
consumers (and whether to pay the fixed cost F ) and which quantities qA and qB to
order. The last stage is consumption in the downstream market. We are looking for
the subgame perfect equilibria of this game. Vertical separation, inducing a double
margin externality, modifies the incentives to innovate for the producer.
1Any wholesale price above 1 would lead to a zero demand, and would thus not be rational, so
that we can make this assumption without loss of generality.
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2.2.1 Downstream listing and pricing strategy
In the second stage, the retailer chooses his listing strategy given the wholesale prices
charged by the producer. If, on the one hand, he decides to distribute the old product
only, he orders the optimal quantity qA = 1−wA2 and gets a profit ΠD =
(1−wA)2
4
while
the producer gets ΠP = wA(1−wA)
2
, possibly less the fixed cost Ω. If, on the other hand,
the retailer decides to distribute product B only, provided that the upstream firm
has innovated, he has nevertheless to pay the fixed cost F . He then maximizes his
profit by ordering the quantity qB = 1−wB2 and makes a profit of ΠDB =
(1−wB)2
4
− F .
Finally, if the retailer chooses to distribute both products, he orders quantities qI =
Max{0, 1−wI−c(1−wJ )
2(1−c2) } (with {I, J} = {A,B}).
Given the wholesale prices wA and wB, the retailer determines his listing strategy
by comparing his profits with or without the new product. Regardless of wA and wB,
the retailer always prefers to distribute both goods instead of only product B: the
strategy of selling the new product only is dominated by the strategy of selling both
products. In addition, if wB ≥ 1− c+ cwA, the retailer would make losses if he sold
both products, in which case he prefers to save on the fixed cost F and sell product
A only. In the other cases, the optimal listing strategy depends on the fixed cost F .
Finally, the retailer distributes the new product only if the fixed cost F of marketing
is smaller than a threshold level that decreases with the wholesale price wB:
F ≤ (1− wA)
2 + (1− wB)2 − 2c(1− wA)(1− wB)
4(1− c2) −
(1− wA)2
4
(1)
The following figure illustrates the listing choice of the retailer in the (wB, F ) plane
for a given value of wA.
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Figure 1: listing strategies of the retailer
2.2.2 Upstream strategy
In the first stage, the producer decides whether to innovate and sets the wholesale
prices anticipating the outcome of the second stage. If she does not innovate, she sets
a wholesale price of wA = 12 that corresponds to a maximal profit of ΠPA =
1
8
. If on the
contrary she innovates, she has to make sure that the retailer will list the new product
as she would make at most ΠPB = 18 − Ω otherwise. She then sets the two wholesale
prices in order to maximize her profit under the constraint (1), which guarantees
that the retailer will list both products. The only interior solution is w∗A = w
∗
B =
1
2
as long as F ≤ 1−c
16(1+c) . For higher values of the fixed cost of distributing the new
product, the producer has to adopt a limit-pricing strategy that induces the retailer
to sell both products. The corner solution is to set a price ewA = 12 for the old
product and ewB = 1 − c2 −p4F (1− c2) for the new one. Finally, the comparison
of the expected profits in each case determines the optimal strategy of the producer
in the first stage (see appendix 1 for the details). Figure 2 compares the resulting
equilibria with the corresponding solution under the vertically integrated structure.
The necessary condition under which a chain of monopolies innovates is more binding
than the corresponding condition for a vertically integrated structure.
.
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Figure 2 : Comparison of innovation strategies
The grey area indicates the values of fixed costs for which a separated chain of
monopolies would not innovate even though an integrated firm would.
Proposition 1 Vertical separation in a chain of monopolies can reduce product va-
riety.
In other words, an integrated structure has better incentives to distribute a new
product than a separated structure. This results from the double margin externality:
the standard issue of coordination in a non-integrated vertical relation generates a
new form of ineﬃciency by reducing the profitability of the new product.
Notice that in this simple case, a two-part tariﬀ associated to a tying contract,
or a two-part tariﬀ with a fixed fee independent of the range of products sold by the
retailer, would be suﬃcient to restore the incentives: when innovation increases total
profits, the upstream firm can set wholesale prices equal to the marginal costs (here,
zero) and get the whole profit2 through the fixed fee. However, if the two goods have
to be priced singly, with two-part tariﬀs wA, FA and wB, FB, the upstream producer
is not able to get all the profit anymore because she has to leave a rent to the retailer
in order to have him selling the two goods. The producer has to give the retailer
2This point relies on the assumption that the producer has all bargaining power, and is only to
enable a comparison with the classical principal-agent literature on double margin. Of course, this
assumption would be unrealistic in most industries, including the music sector.
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an incentive to list both products rather than only one of them, which requires the
following incentives constraints to be satisfied, where ΠID is the variable part of the
retailer’s profit (excluding the payment of the fixed costs) : ΠA+BD −FA−FB ≥ ΠAD−FA
and ΠA+BD −FA−FB ≥ ΠBD−FB , which implies that 2ΠA+BD −ΠAD −ΠBD ≥ FA+FB.
Yet ΠA+BD < ΠAD +ΠBD because the products are substitutes. Thus FA+FB < ΠA+BD :
finally, even if the producer can delegate the optimal choices to the retailers by setting
variable prices to her marginal costs of production, she cannot get the whole profit of
the vertical structure through the fixed part FA + FB.
Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that the incentives to distribute the new
product are more sensitive to the fixed cost of production Ω than to the fixed cost of
distribution F . Indeed, when the latter is high, the producer can adapt her wholesale
price by setting a limit price that leads the retailer to distribute both products. On
the contrary, when the fixed cost of production is high, the retailer cannot commit to
share the cost spent by its vertical supplier who unilaterally decides not to introduce
the new variety.
3 Competition in the retail industry
We have seen in the first part that vertical separation of the activities of production
and distribution can reduce product variety. However, it is well known that down-
stream competition reduces double margin problems: we address here the question
of how retail competition can aﬀect product variety, when variety brings about fixed
costs at both levels. We thus analyze the eﬀect of imperfect competition between two
retailers on the incentives of an upstream firm to introduce a new variety. We look
now at the following situation: two retailers D1 and D2 sell producer P ’s production
to the consumers. The 3-stage game is as follows. In the first stage the producer
decides whether to innovate or not and sets the wholesale prices. In the second stage,
the retailers simultaneously decide whether to invest the fixed cost to be able to sell
the new product. This cost is sunk. In a third stage, as the outcome of the investment
decisions are made public, the retailers simultaneously order the quantities of the two
goods they are going to put on their shelves, and the prices on the final market are
determined by the consumer inverse demand. Retail competition is thus à la Cournot.
The fixed cost F is sunk and represents a commitment3 of the retailers on their listing
3In a previous version of this article, we solved the game without this commitment eﬀect of the
sunk cost, considering that stages 2 and 3 were simultaneous. This led to more equilibria: for a
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choices: if a retailer does not pay F in the second stage, he will not be able to sell
the new product in stage 3. We solve this game for subgame perfect equilibria.
3.1 Downstream quantity competition
In this section we determine the equilibrium outcome of downstream competition,
given wholesale prices (wA, wB) and the investment decisions of the second stage. We
assume that wholesale prices are smaller than 1, a necessary condition for products
to be profitable to market. At the third stage of the game, retailers are already
committed to their listing strategies, and there are three diﬀerent subgames to analyze
(plus the symmetric ones): either both retailers have invested the sunk cost F, or one
only, or none of them.
3.1.1 No retailer has invested
In this first subsection, only one good is distributed: A. Downstream competition is
thus a simple monoproduct Cournot game. There exists a unique equilibrium where
the two retailers sell the same quantity of the old product A: q1A = q
2
A =
1−wA
3
. Both
retailers make profit ΠDA =
(1−wA)2
9
.
3.1.2 Both retailers have paid the fixed cost
In this configuration, each retailer chooses two quantities (possibly setting them to
zero). Solving the Cournot game leads to the following strategies according to the
values of the wholesale prices (technical details are given in the Appendix). If the
wholesale price of good B is too high, only good A is distributed. On the contrary,
for small values of wB, only the new good is distributed. Finally, there exists an
equilibrium in which both goods coexist on the shelves for intermediary values of wB.
In addition, the set of values of wB for which both products are distributed shrinks
with c, the degree of substitutability of the two products: the lower bound on wB
below which the retailers only distribute B increases with c, while the upper bound
above which the retailers only sell the old good decreases with c. Indeed, for high
values of c, products are highly substitutable and compete for shelf space, in which
case the retailers prefer to only distribute the most profitable good. We also show
given configuration of retail costs, several equilibria existed. However, our results were qualitatively
similar.
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that the same set of values of wB shrinks with wA. However, now, both the upper
and the lower bounds of the interval shift to the right as wA increases. This shift
translates the fact that the profitability of A decreases with wA regardless of whether
product B is also distributed or not. We should also point out that in this subgame,
none of the asymmetric market configurations arises at equilibrium, although they
were a priori possible.
3.1.3 Asymmetric configuration: one retailer only has paid the sunk cost
In this subgame, one of the retailers can only sell product A. We refer to this retailer
as retailer 2. The other retailer chooses his listing strategy. We completely solve
the downstream Cournot subgame in the Appendix. There are 4 configurations to
analyze according to the values of wB. Only good A is distributed if the wholesale
price of B is too high, and this threshold is identical to the one found in the previous
subsection. For values of wB slightly below this threshold, both goods are distributed
by the retailer who has invested the fixed cost of marketing the new product. For
even smaller values of wB, this retailer only distributes good B while his competitor
is constrained to sell only good A. Finally, for very small values of wB, the retailer
who did not spend the fixed cost to distribute the new good must exit the market,
leaving his competitor in a monopoly situation in the market for good B. Notice that
in that case, retailer 1 still leaves good A out of the shelves to avoid cannibalization of
the sales of good B. As in the previous subsection, the set of values of wB for which
the new product is distributed shifts to the right as wA increases and the size of the
interval decreases as parameter c increases.
It is interesting to observe that asymmetric equilibria with downstream specializa-
tion are due to the commitment value of the sunk cost F . Indeed, in a Cournot game
without this commitment eﬀect, the retailers do not have incentives to specialize: a
retailer who did not pay the fixed cost could always deviate from the equilibrium
strategy by reducing the quantities of A on the shelves and by oﬀering a small but
positive quantity of B. When the fixed cost F is sunk, the retailer who has paid it
knows that, at the last stage of the game, his competitor can not sell good B. Under
this assumption, for small values of wB, distributing good A will only cannibalize sales
from good B and this retailer prefers to leave his competitor in a monopoly position
on the market for good A, while enjoying a monopoly position on the market for good
B.
We can now analyze the investment decisions of the retailers at the second stage
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of the game.
3.2 Investment decisions
This stage of the game is only played if the producer has developed the new product.
Retailers have to choose whether to invest the fixed cost or not in order to distribute
the new product. They take wholesale prices wA and wB as given and anticipate
downstream market outcomes.
There are five market configurations in this subgame. In the symmetric equilibria
each retailer only sells the new good, or only the old one, or both. In the first
asymmetric configuration, each retailer specializes in only one good. In the second
asymmetric case, one retailer only sells the old good and his competitor sells both
goods. The following figure summarizes these configurations, which are detailed in
appendix 2.
c
wA )1(21 −−
c
wA)1(1 −−
c
wc A
3
)1)(2(1
2 −+−
F
Bw)1(1 Awc −−
non F,
non F
(A,A)F, non F
(B,A)
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F, non F 
(AB,A)
F, F
(B,B)
F, non F
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Figure 3 : downstream subgame equilibria with competition
For given values of the wholesale prices, equilibria in which good B is sold disap-
pear as the fixed cost of marketing the new product increases. Moreover, the higher
the value of wB the lower the profits generated by sales of B. These results confirm
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the intuition that for low values of the wholesale prices and of the fixed costs, both
retailers invest to distribute good B, while for high values of F and wB, the total cost
of distributing the new product is too high and both retailers symmetrically choose to
stick to the old product. The commitment value of the sunk cost F has an interesting
implication: for intermediate values of F , retailers adopt a ”specialization” strategy
that is characterized by the fact that only one retailer invests in the distribution of the
new good (possibly together with product A) and the other retailer only distributes
the old product.
3.3 Innovation decision
In the first stage of the game, the producer decides whether to introduce the new
variety and determines the wholesale prices. She anticipates the strategies of the
retailers in stage 2 and sets her product lines and the wholesale prices in order to
maximize her profits. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes are detailed in
Appendix A4 where we also compare profits of the diﬀerent players with those obtained
in the chain of monopolies. The main results are summarized in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 A producer facing a competitive downstream market innovates more
often than if she faced a single retailer.
Proof : see appendix A4.
More precisely, when the fixed costs of introducing the new variety are such that
the chain of monopolies innovates, a producer who faces a competitive downstream
market also innovates. However, there are parameter configurations in which the
chain of monopolies does not innovate whereas the downstream competition leads to
innovation. This situation occurs in two areas where one of the fixed costs is large and
the other is small (see Figure 4). In the first area, the total cost of introducing the
new variety is mainly supported by the producer. When the downstream fixed cost is
relatively small ( F ≤ 1−c
36(1+c) and Ω ∈
h
1−c
8(1+c) ,
1−c
6(1+c)
i
), a chain of monopolies does
not introduce the new product, while downstream competition allows the producer to
charge wholesale prices that are below the unconstrained optimum (wA = wB = 1/2) .
Donwstream competition increases the quantities of both goods sold by the producer
who can then bear a larger fixed cost of innovation than when she faces a single
retailer. For larger values of F, the producer reduces the wholesale price of the new
product to give incentives to the retailer to distribute it. This limit-pricing strategy
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is profitable as long as the fixed cost is not too large and as retailers keep distributing
the new product, i.e. until F = 1−c
16(1+c) . In the area being discussed, the competitive
downstream market has a higher innovation rate mainly because competition reduces
the double margin externalities, which makes the new product more profitable to
introduce for the producer.
For intermediate values of the fixed costs, downstream competition does not lead
to more product introduction than the chain of monopolies: the area in which the
new product is marketed is the same under the two structures. Indeed, competition
between retailers reduces profits and make it harder to support the fixed costs. As
a matter of fact, in this area, only one retailer distributes the new product, while
both retailers keep distributing the old product. The quantity of good B sold under
this configuration is the same as in the vertically separated monopoly case; the profits
generated by sales of good B are also identical. It would be too costly for the producer
to charge wholesale prices that give more incentives to the retailers to distribute the
new product, as the producer also faces a fixed cost of innovating. Thus, the producer
facing a competitive downstream market has the same innovation incentives as when
he only faces a single retailer.
On the contrary, as the fixed distribution cost increases even more and the share
of the total cost supported by the producer shrinks, downstream competition leads to
a new area where the competitive structure innovates more than the chain of monop-
olies. This area only exists when the products A and B are rather close substitutes
(for c ≥ 1/2). In this case, for F in the interval [1−c2
36c2 , F ] where F ≥
1−c
4(1+c) , product
B is distributed when Ω is relatively small. This area is larger under downstream
competition than in the chain of monopolies. Indeed, the fixed cost of innovating of
the producer being small, she can aﬀord a lower wholesale price wB that leads one of
the retailers to distribute the new good. This product line extension increases total
demand. In this area, the commitment value of the fixed cost F analyzed in the second
stage of the game leads the retailers to specialize: each retailer sells only one of the
goods and has a monopoly position on its market. This market configuration leads
to a paradoxical outcome. When the fixed cost F is large, retailers specialize in the
distribution of only one good, which increases the profitability of the new product but
limits competition between retailers. It is worth stressing that the strategy of special-
ization is only feasible when both products are relatively close substitutes, i.e. when
products are competing for shelf space. This implies that the retailer who chooses to
distribute the new product gives up the old product to avoid cannibalization.
15
To summarize, downstream competition increases the rate of innovation through
two mechanisms: a classical mechanism related to a reduction in the vertical exter-
nality and a strategic mechanism related to the specialization of the retailers, which is
conditioned by the commitment value of the fixed cost of marketing the new product.
We can now compare the incentives to innovate when retailers are competing to the
incentives of a vertically integrated structure.
Proposition 3 If the two goods are poor substitutes (c ≤ 1/2), a producer selling
her products through a competitive downstream sector introduces less variety than a
vertically integrated monopoly;
If the two goods are close substitutes (c ≥ 1/2), a competitive retail industry innovates
less than a vertically integrated monopoly except when the share of the total fixed cost
of introducing the new variety supported by the producer is small (F >> Ω).
Proof: see appendix A.5.
We illustrate Proposition 2 and 3 in the following figure in the (Ω, F ) plane (for
c ≥ 1/2).
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Figure 4 : comparison of equilibrium innovation strategies
Even if downstream firms are competing, the vertical externality related to the
double margin remains and lowers the incentives to innovate of the producer. This
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eﬀect dominates when the distribution cost (F ) is low. In this case, the vertically
separated structure innovates less than a vertically integrated monopoly. However, an
opposite vertical eﬀect appears when the new product is less profitable to market (i.e.
when F is large compared to Ω) and is a close substitute to the old product (i.e. c is
large). Now, the upstream firms soften downstream competition by setting wholesale
prices so as to enforce an asymmetric retail market in which one firm distributes the
old product and another firm distributes the new product. Hence, specialized firms
do not directly compete for the new product. This market environment can sustain
innovation when a vertically integrated firm would not innovate.
Proposition 3 has several implications. First, from an empirical perspective, the
strategy of the upstream firm of relaxing the competitive pressure in the downstream
market is observed for a new product that is costly to distribute and that strongly
substitutes to the older product. In this case, even if retailers specialize, downstream
competition is relatively strong (at the second stage of the game). Secondly, compe-
tition authorities do not generally frown upon vertical mergers because of the vertical
externality. In our model, a vertical integration can have a negative eﬀect on inno-
vation strategies if the innovation is costly to market but relatively cheap to produce
(incremental innovation), whereas a vertically integrated structure innovates more
when the innovation is costly to produce but not too costly to market (radical inno-
vation).
Finally, total surplus (net of the fixed costs) is defined as W (QA, QB; c) = QA +
QB − 12(Q2A +Q2B)− cQAQB. It is easy to show that the total welfare at equilibrium,
W ∗(c) = W (Q∗A(c), Q
∗
B(c)), is decreasing in c for 0 < c < 1 in each product configu-
ration. Moreover, for almost each equilibrium listing strategy, total surplus is higher
under vertical integration, followed by downstream competition and then vertically
separated monopolies. In the case in which a competitive retail sector distributes the
new product but the vertically integrated structure does not, total surplus is higher
when there is innovation: competition increases social surplus by increasing the va-
riety oﬀered to consumers, when the cost of launching the new product is mainly
supported by the upstream firm, and when the new product is a close substitute to
the old one.
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4 Conclusion
We have explained how a market’s vertical and competitive structures influences en-
dogenous product variety choices, when the launching of a new product involves fixed
costs of distribution as well as fixed costs of production. We have highlighted sev-
eral mechanisms -both horizontal and vertical- behind this influence. First of all, the
profit-cutting eﬀect of double marginalization reduces the incentives to invest in the
launching of a new product. In a chain of monopolies, vertical integration thus favours
the adoption of a new product that increases the scope and the variety of products
distributed to consumers with heterogeneous tastes. Thus, vertical separation of the
production and the distribution activities may generate conflicts of interest between
the vertically related firms, which translates into a lower innovation eﬀort and leads
to too few products distributed to the consumers. To restore the vertical eﬃciency,
two-part tariﬀs with a franchise fee independant of the range of products distributed,
or sophisticated contracts including full-line forcing clauses would be necessary.
Downstream competition may however soften the vertical ineﬃciencies. When we
analyze a more complex framework with a producer launching a new product and
two competing retailers, the eﬀect of competition on the incentives to increase prod-
uct variety depends on the degree of novelty of the new product, and also from the
allocation of the fixed costs between upstream and downstream firms. If manufactur-
ing and retail activities are vertically separated, then downstream competition leads
to more variety than does retail concentration. In addition, vertical separation with
downstream competition may lead to more or less innovation than vertical integra-
tion, depending again on the allocation of fixed costs and on the degree of product
substitution. When the retail costs are less than the manufacturing costs of launch-
ing the new product, retail competition, by reducing downstream profits, lessens the
retailer’s ability to invest in the fixed cost, and thus hinders the development of the
new product. In that case, a vertically integrated firm would launch the new prod-
uct more often than an upstream monopoly facing two competing retailers. On the
contrary, when the new product is more costly to sell than to manufacture, a ver-
tically separated structure with downstream competition may innovate more than a
vertically integrated monopolist because retailers are ready to sell the new product
even with high costs in order to segment the downstream market. In terms of policy
implications, our model stresses the necessity to preserve competition at the retail
level to support innovation.
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A Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium in the chain of monopolies
Retailer’s strategy If only product A is available, the retailer orders qA = 1−wA2 ,
gets profit ΠD = (1−wA)
2
4
,and the producer’s profit is ΠP = wA(1−wA)
2
.
If the retailer lists both products, his maximum profit is:
ΠA+B = (1−wA)
2+(1−wB)2−2c(1−wA)(1−wB)
4(1−c2) −F and is attained for the following quan-
tities ({I, J} = {A,B}) :
qA+BI =Max{0,
1− wI − c(1− wJ)
2(1− c2) }
Producer’s strategy The comparison of her anticipated profits gives the pro-
ducer’s optimal strategy in the first stage:
-if F ≤ 1−c
16(1+c) and Ω ≤
1−c
8(1+c) , she innovates, sets the optimal wholesale prices
w∗A = w
∗
B =
1
2
and gets the interior optimal profit ΠPA+B = 14(1+c) − Ω.
-ifF ≥ 1−c
16(1+c) and Ω ≤
q
F (1−c
1+c)− 2F, she innovates, sets the optimal wholesale
price w∗A =
1
2
and the limit-price ewB = 1− c2 −p4F (1− c2), and gets profit eΠPA+B =
1−16F
8
+
√
F (1−c2)
1+c − Ω.
-if Ω ≥ 1−c
8(1+c) or F ≥
1−c
16(1+c) and Ω ≥
q
F (1−c
1+c)− 2F, she does not innovate, sets
wA =
1
2
, and gets profit ΠPA = 18 .
A.2 Downstream competition : third stage of the game
If both retailers have paid the fixed cost F, downstream Cournot equilibrium are as
follows, for given values of the wholesale prices :
- if wB ≥ 1− c(1− wA), only A is sold.
- if 1− c(1− wA) ≥ wB ≥ 1− (1− wA)/c, each retailer sells both goods.
- if 1− (1− wA)/c ≥ wB, only B is sold.
If only one retailer, say 1, has paid the fixed cost F, downstream Cournot equilib-
rium are as follows :
- if wB ≥ 1− c(1− wA), only A is sold by both retailers.
- if 1− c(1−wA) ≥ wB ≥ 1− (1−wA)(2+c
2)
3c , retailer 1 sells both goods in quantities
q1A =
(2+c2)(1−wA)−3c(1−wB)
6(1−c2) , q
1
B =
1−wB−c(1−wA)
2(1−c2) and his competitor sells only good A in
quantity q2A =
1−wA
3
.
20
- if 1− (1−wA)(2+c
2)
3c ≥ wB ≥ 1−
2(1−wA)
c , the retailers specialise in a narrower range
of products: retailer 1 sells only B and his competitor only A .
- if 1 − 2(1 − wA)/c ≥ wB, there exists a unique equilibrium where the retailer
who did not invest the fixed cost exits the market (or sells a zero quantity of good
A) while the other one enjoys a monopoly situation over the two goods, but chooses
not to sell good A in order to avoid cannibalisation of his sales of good B. Then he
chooses to sell the monopoly quantity of the new product: q1MB,∅ =
1−wB
2
.
A.3 Retailers’ investment strategies
In the second stage, in the subgame where the producer has innovated, and given the
wholesale prices wA and wB :
A.3.1 if wB ≥ 1− c(1− wA),
In that case, the wholesale price of new product is so high that even if a retailer pays
the fixed cost F, he cannot sell the new product with profit, whatever his competitor’s
strategy might be. Thus both retailers decline to invest in the fixed cost, and in the
following stage A will be the only product available.
A.3.2 If 1− (1−wA)(2+c2)
3c ≤ wB ≤ 1− c(1− wA),
Anticipating the third stage outcomes, the second stage choices can be summarised
in the following normal form game, where F denotes the choice of paying the fixed
cost and non F the other strategy :
F non F
F ΠDAB,AB,ΠDAB,AB Π1AB,A,Π2AB,A
non F Π2AB,A,Π1AB,A
(1−wA)2
9
,
(1−wA)2
9
Comparing these profits gives the following subgame equilibria :
if F ≤ (c(1−wA)−(1−wB))
2
9(1−c2) , both retailers pay F and sell both goods in the third
stage;
if (c(1−wA)−(1−wB))
2
9(1−c2) ≤ F ≤
(c(1−wA)−(1−wB))2
4(1−c2) , only one retailer invests F to sell both
goods, and his competitor sells only A;
if F ≥ (c(1−wA)−(1−wB))
2
4(1−c2) , both retailers give up the selling of the new product: none
pays F , and both sell A.
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A.3.3 If 1− 1−wAc ≤ wB ≤ 1−
(1−wA)(2+c2)
3c
In that case the normal form game is as follows :
F non F
F ΠDAB,AB,ΠDAB,AB Π1B,A,Π2B,A
non F Π2B,A,Π1B,A
(1−wA)2
9
,
(1−wA)2
9
Comparing these profits gives the following subgame equilibria :
if F ≤ (1−wA)
2−2c(1−wA)(1−wB)+(1−wB)2
9(1−c2) −
(2(1−wA)−c(1−wB))2
(4−c2)2 , both retailers pay F and
sell both products;
if (1−wA)
2−2c(1−wA)(1−wB)+(1−wB)2
9(1−c2) −
(2(1−wA)−c(1−wB))2
(4−c2)2 ≤ F ≤
(c(1−wA)−2(1−wB))2
(4−c2)2 −
(1−wA)2
9
, only one retailer invests F to sell only B, and his competitor sells only A;
if F ≥ (c(1−wA)−2(1−wB))
2
(4−c2)2 −
(1−wA)2
9
, no retailer pays F , both sell only product A.
A.3.4 If 1− 2−2wAc ≤ wB ≤ 1−
1−wA
c
This zone may exist only if wA ≥ 1 − c. In that case the normal form game is as
follows :
F non F
F ΠDB,B,ΠDB,B Π1B,A,Π2B,A
non F Π2B,A,Π1B,A
(1−wA)2
9
,
(1−wA)2
9
Comparing these profits gives the following subgame equilibria :
if F ≤ (1−wB)
2
9
− (2(1−wA)−c(1−wB))
2
(4−c2)2 , both retailers pay F and sell only B;
if (1−wB)
2
9
− (2(1−wA)−c(1−wB))
2
(4−c2)2 ≤ F ≤
(c(1−wA)−2(1−wB))2
(4−c2)2 −
(1−wA)2
9
, only one retailer
pays F to sell only B, his competitor sells only A;
if F ≥ (c(1−wA)−2(1−wB))2
(4−c2)2 −
(1−wA)2
9
, no retailer pays F , both sell only A.
A.3.5 If wB ≤ 1− 2−2wAc
This zone may exist only if wA ≥ 1 − c2 . In that case the normal form game is as
follows :
F non F
F
(1−wB)2
9
− F, (1−wB)2
9
− F (1−wB)2
4
− F, 0
non F 0, (1−wB)
2
4
− F (1−wA)
2
9
,
(1−wA)2
9
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Comparing these profits gives the following subgame equilibria :
if F ≥ (1−wB)2
4
− (1−wA)2
9
, no retailer pays F , both sell only A;
if (1−wB)
2
9
≤ F ≤ (1−wB)2
4
− (1−wA)2
9
, only one retailer pays F , his competitor exits
the market. The monopolist retailer sells only product B;
if F ≤ (1−wB)
2
9
both retailers pay F and sell only B.
A.4 Upstream choice: proof of proposition 2
In the first stage, the producer innovates if the profit she gets by selling the new
product is higher than ΠPAA = 16 , the profit she gets with product A only. If she
innovates, her profit depends on the quantities sold by the retailers in stage 3. We
summarize here the producer’s optimal choices in equilibrium.
(i) If F ≤ 1−c
36(1+c) , she innovates if and only if Ω ≤
1−c
6(1+c) , and both retailers sell both
goods in the interior optimum. For such values of F, the chain of monopolies would
innovate only if Ω ≤ 1−c
8(1+c) : downstream competition leads here to more innovation
than a chain of monopolies would oﬀer.
(ii) If 1−c
36(1+c) ≤ F ≤
1−c
16(1+c) , the producer has to use a limit-pricing strategy
in order to induce the two retailers to sell both goods each in equilibrium. The
producer innovates if and only if Ω ≤ 2
q
F (1−c)
1+c −6F, with 2
q
F (1−c)
1+c −6F ≥
1−c
8(1+c) for
F ∈ [ 1−c
144(1+c) ,
1−c
16(1+c) ]. For such values of F, the chain of monopolies would innovate
only if Ω ≤ 1−c
8(1+c) : downstream competition leads here again to more innovation than
a chain of monopolies would oﬀer.
(iii) If F ≥ 1−c
16(1+c) , the producer sets the wholesale prices in order to induce one
of the retailers to list the new product, the other retailer selling only the old one. In
that case, if c ≤ 1/2, the producer chooses a limit-pricing strategy, denoted A^B,A
, such that one only of the two retailers invests F and sells both goods, the other
selling only good A. This strategy brings about more profit than no innovation for
Ω ≤
q
F (1−c)
1+c − 2F, which corresponds exactly to the frontier of innovation in the
chain of monopolies case.
On the contrary if c ≥ 1/2, this strategy is no more possible for F ≥ 1−c2
36c2 , and the
best the producer can do is then to set prices inducing the retailers to specialize, one
of them paying F to sell only the new product B, and the other selling only A without
investing. This strategy always dominates4 the absence of innovation for fixed costs
4Notice that this particular pricing strategy is not necessary the optimal one, but it is enough to
show that the optimal strategy will lead to innovation in this zone.
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such that the chain of monopolies would innovate, and even in a wider zone defined by
Ω ≤ ΩA,B with ΩA,B = −2F − 7−c2
72
+ c
2
2
F +(1− c
2
)
q
F + 1
36
, so ΩA,B ≥
q
F (1−c)
1+c −2F .
In other words, for such values of F and c, downstream competition leads here to
more innovation than a chain of monopolies would oﬀer.
A.5 Proof of proposition 3
If c ≥ 1/2, proposition 2 showed that for F ≥ 1−c2
36c2 , the strategy to develop the
new product and set prices inducing the retailers to specialize dominates the strategy
without innovation for Ω ≤ ΩA,B = −2F − 7−c2
72
+ c
2
2
F + (1− c
2
)
q
F + 1
36
. In the plan
(Ω, F ), this frontier intersects the F axe in FA,B ≥ 1−c
4(1+c) for any c ≥ 1/2. Thus the
zone in which retailers’ specialization allows the development of the new product is
wider than the zone in which the vertically integrated monopoly would innovate for
such values of c.
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